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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This report describes a framework for proliferation resistance and physical protection evaluation for the 
fuel cycle systems envisioned in the expansion of nuclear power for electricity generation.  The 
methodology is based on an approach developed as part of the Generation IV technical evaluation 
framework and on a qualitative evaluation approach to policy factors similar to those that were introduced 
in previous Nonproliferation Impact Assessments performed by DOE. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the Department of Energy (DOE) is 
performing a Nonproliferation Impact Assessment (NPIA) to support the DOE Secretarial decision on 
how to proceed with the GNEP program.  This report includes an overview of the PR&PP framework that 
is useful for comparing the nonproliferation aspects of alternatives. The NPIA and the Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for GNEP are supporting studies for the Secretarial decision. 
 
The assessment framework for the NPIA is based in part on the PR&PP evaluation methodology [1] that 
was developed as part of the Generation IV technical evaluation framework and on a qualitative 
evaluation approach to policy factors similar to those that were introduced in previous NPIA studies [2].  
Taken together, the overall assessment consists of a short list of technical and policy factors.  We note 
that the GNEP PEIS is a review of programmatic alternatives and the GNEP is an R&D program that has 
yet to select all of the technologies and sites.  To the extent possible, each factor is graded (or rated) for 
each alternative to or within GNEP. Where appropriate, the factors that are expected to be important in 
the subsequent assessments of GNEP technology or sites are listed.  The grading is expressed in 
qualitative terms with each grade supported by specific technical and policy evaluations as described in 
the following subsections. 
 
2. DEFINITION OF PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE 
 
A clear definition of proliferation resistance is needed to establish a firm foundation for the analysis and 
assessment to be performed in this NPIA.  The definition given below has been agreed to by the 
Generation IV International Forum (GIF) and agrees with the definition established at the international 
workshop sponsored by the IAEA in Como, Italy, in 2002 [3].  For comparison and distinction, the 
PR&PP definition of physical protection is also given. 
 
Proliferation resistance is that characteristic of a nuclear energy system (NES) that impedes the diversion 
or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by the Host State seeking to acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  
 
The nuclear energy system for GNEP is regarded here to be the facilities that comprise it, their 
safeguards, their physical security, the fuel supply and take-back services among its participants, and the 
corresponding transportation of nuclear materials or sensitive technology. Thus the GIF definition of 
proliferation resistance applies to GNEP. 
 
It is important to note that while the PR&PP definitions provide a foundation for evaluating the relative 
PR&PP risks of GNEP, there can be other factors which influence the nonproliferation impact of GNEP. 
For example, the nuclear fuel cycle decisions of various countries need to be consider with regard to the 
benefits and challenges for GNEP. This is discussed in Section 4. 
 
As noted above, the definition of physical protection is also important to recognize. According to PR&PP, 
it is as follows.  
 
Physical protection (robustness) is that characteristic of an NES that impedes the theft of materials 
suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices (RDDs) and the sabotage of facilities and 
transportation by sub-national entities and other non-Host State adversaries.  
 
These definitions are given further specificity in terms of the measures for evaluating PR&PP. These are 
discussed in Section 4. While PP is discussed here for completeness and to distinguish it from PR, it is not 
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evaluated for GNEP in this NPIA. The relevant PP factors will be discussed here, and a complete 
evaluation will be part of technology and site selections. 
 
3. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic paradigm for the PR&PP methodological approach. For a given system, 
analysts define a set of challenges, analyze system response to these challenges, and assess outcomes. 
The challenges to the GNEP system are the threats posed by potential proliferant States and by sub-
national adversaries. The technical and institutional characteristics of the NES are used to evaluate the 
response of the system and determine its resistance to proliferation threats and robustness against 
sabotage and terrorism threats. The outcomes of the system response are expressed in terms of PR&PP 
measures and assessed.  
 
The evaluation methodology accounts for both the intrinsic and extrinsic protective features of the GNEP 
system. Intrinsic features include the physical and engineering aspects of the GNEP system; extrinsic 
features include institutional aspects such as safeguards and external barriers.  
 
 
Figure 1   Basic Framework for the PR&PP Evaluation Methodology for GNEP 
 
Figure 2 provides an expanded outline of the methodological approach. The first step is threat definition.  
For both PR and PP, the threat definition describes the challenges that the system may face and includes 
characteristics of both the actor and the actor’s strategy. For PR, the actor is the Host State within the 
GNEP system, and the threat definition includes both the proliferation objectives and the capabilities and 
strategy of the Host State. For PP threats, the actor is a sub-national group or other non-Host State 
adversary.  The PP actors’ characteristics are defined by their objective, which may be either theft or 
sabotage, and their capabilities and strategies. 
 
The challenges to GNEP are defined in terms of a standard Reference Threat Set (RTS), covering the 
anticipated range of actors, capabilities, and strategies.  
 
For PR, the threats include 
 
• Concealed diversion of declared materials 
• Concealed misuse of declared facilities 
• Overt misuse of facilities or diversion of declared materials 
• Clandestine dedicated facilities. 
 
For PP, the threats include 
 
• Radiological sabotage 
• Material theft 
• Information theft. 
 
 
CHALLENGES                   SYSTEM RESPONSE                      OUTCOMES 
Threats                                   PR & PP                          Assessment 
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Figure 2   Detailed Framework for the PR&PP Evaluation Methodology 
 
 
The selection of potential threats to include is performed at the beginning of a PR&PP evaluation. The 
uncertainty in the system response to a given threat is then evaluated independently of the probability that 
the system would ever actually be challenged by the threat. In other words, PR&PP evaluations are 
contingent on the challenge occurring. 
 
After the threats have been sufficiently detailed for the GNEP evaluation, the system response is 
performed and has four components: 
 
1. System Element Identification. The GNEP system is decomposed into smaller elements or 
subsystems at a level amenable to further analysis. The elements can comprise a facility (in the 
systems engineering sense), part of a facility, a collection of facilities, or a transportation system 
within the identified GNEP subsystem where acquisition (diversion) or processing (PR) or 
theft/sabotage (PP) could take place. 
 
2. Target Identification and Categorization. Target identification is conducted by systematically 
examining the GNEP system for the role that materials, equipment, and processes in each element 
could play in each of the strategies identified in the threat definition. PR targets are nuclear 
material, equipment, and processes to be protected from threats of diversion and misuse. PP 
Threat Definition Challenges 
System Element Identification
System 
Response Pathway Identification and Refinement 
Target Identification and Categorization
Estimation of Measures 
Outcomes 
System Assessment & Presentation of Results 
Pathway Comparison 
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targets are nuclear material, equipment, or information to be protected from threats of theft and 
sabotage.  Targets are categorized to create representative or bounding sets for further analysis. 
 
3. Pathway Identification and Refinement. Pathways are potential sequences of events and 
actions followed by the actor to achieve objectives.  For each target, individual pathways are 
divided into segments through a systematic process, and analyzed at a high level. Segments are 
then connected into full pathways and analyzed in detail. Selection of appropriate pathways will 
depend on the scenarios themselves, the state of design information, the quality and applicability 
of available information, and expert input. 
 
4. Estimation of Measures.  The results of the system response are expressed in terms of PR&PP 
measures. Measures are the high-level characteristics of a pathway that affect the likely decisions 
and actions of an actor and therefore are used to evaluate the actor’s likely behavior and the 
outcomes.  For each measure, the results for each pathway segment are aggregated as appropriate 
to compare pathways and assess the system so that significant pathways can be identified and 
highlighted for further assessment and decision making. 
 
For PR, the measures are 
 
• Proliferation Technical Difficulty (TD) – The inherent difficulty, arising from the need for 
technical sophistication and materials handling capabilities, required to overcome the multiple 
barriers to proliferation.  
• Proliferation Cost (PC) – The economic and staffing investment required to overcome the 
multiple technical barriers to proliferation including the use of existing or new facilities. 
• Proliferation Time (PT) – The minimum time required to overcome the multiple barriers to 
proliferation (i.e., the total time planned by the Host State for the project) 
• Fissile Material Type (MT) – A categorization of material based on the degree to which its 
characteristics affect its utility for use in nuclear explosives. 
• Detection Probability (DP) – The cumulative probability of detecting a proliferation segment or 
pathway. 
• Detection Resource Efficiency (DE) – The efficiency in the use of staffing, equipment, and 
funding to apply international safeguards to the NES. 
 
For PP, the measures are 
 
• Probability of Adversary Success – The probability that an adversary will successfully complete 
the actions described by a pathway and generates a consequence. 
• Consequences – The effects resulting from the successful completion of the adversary’s action 
described by a pathway. 
• Physical Protection Resources – the staffing, capabilities, and costs required to provide PP, such 
as background screening, detection, interruption, and neutralization, and the sensitivity of these 
resources to changes in the threat sophistication and capability. 
 
The final steps in PR&PP evaluations are to integrate the findings of the analysis and to interpret the 
results. Evaluation results include best estimates for numerical and linguistic descriptors that characterize 
the results, distributions reflecting the uncertainty associated with those estimates, and appropriate 
displays to communicate uncertainties.  
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4. TECHNICAL FACTORS AND METRICS 
 
As noted above, there are two categories of factors and metrics that are essential to the NPIA: technical 
factors and policy factors. The former are derived from the PR&PP methodology while the latter capture 
the broader suite of policy, legal, and institutional approaches used to secure nonproliferation objectives. 
This section elaborates on the technical aspects and Section 5 discusses policy aspects. 
 
The link between technical factors, PR&PP measures, and their underlying metrics can be summarized by 
the following.  
 
1. The measures are the fundamental constituents of proliferation resistance 
2. The metrics are the scales or units in which they are expressed 
3. The technical factors are higher level expression of proliferation resistance that are more readily 
usable by the decision maker. They are supported by the measures. 
 
Three high level technical factors are evaluated in this NPIA. They are: 
 
• T1: Avoiding Proliferator Success 
• T2: Facilitating Cost Effective International Monitoring 
• T3: Resulting in Less Attractive Material Types and Forms  
 
These technical factors are informed by the PR&PP measures by the following association. 
 
Technical Factors Associated PR&PP Measures 
Avoiding Proliferator Success (T1) • Technical Difficulty (PR) 
• Proliferation Cost (PR) 
• Proliferation Time (PR) 
• Detection Probability (PR) 
• Probability of Adversary Success (PP) 
• Consequences (PP) 
Facilitating Cost Effective International Monitoring 
(T2) 
• Detection Resource Efficiency (PR) 
• Detection Probability (PR) 
• Physical Protection Resources (PP) 
Resulting in Less Attractive Material Types and 
Forms (T3) 
• Material Type (PR) 
• Consequences (PP) 
 
Grading Structure for Technical Factors 
 
A grading structure is proposed for the three technical factors 
 
• Immediate and substantial impact 
• Delayed but substantial impact 
• Significantly delayed and/or minimal impact 
 
There are other grading approaches as well, but undefined notions of high, medium, and low are not very 
useful since they are not particularly descriptive. The example grades give a qualitative notion of time and 
scale of possible consequence. 
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Proliferation Resistance Measures 
 
For evaluation of proliferation resistance to host state threats, after measures have been estimated for 
pathways, pathways are compared and ranked to identify the significant pathways.  To facilitate pathway 
comparison, quantitative metrics are applied to the TD, PC, PT, MT, and DP measures to relate them to 
linguistic values, from very low to very high, that would suggest the likely decision-making by a 
proliferant State.  Likewise, for the DE measure, a quantitative metric is applied to reflect the magnitude 
of required resources, relative to the resources that the IAEA commonly applies to safeguard facilities.  
The analyst may select other quantitative metrics appropriate for comparing pathways for the specific 
threat being considered. As a starting point, the analyst may choose to apply the approximate, 
representative metrics given in Table 1, below. These are presented as one example approach to 
evaluation. The evaluation of measures is not prescriptive and is generally tailored to the specific 
questions being addressed.  
 
In Table 1, the PP measures have also been included, for completeness. However, explicit example 
metrics are not shown in this report. These would be tailored to the purposes and needs of a national 
assessment and would be associated with the specific threats to be addressed. A brief discussion of the PP 
measure is given at the end of this section. 
 
Each of the PR measures and corresponding metrics are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Proliferation Technical Difficulty (TD) Measure 
 
The TD measure is estimated using a metric scale as shown in the example given in Table IV.3.  
Technical difficulty arises from inherent characteristics of the pathway that create difficulty and thus a 
potential for failure from technical problems.  When scaled to reflect the State’s capability, the TD 
measure assists in distinguishing pathways a proliferant State would judge to have higher risk of technical 
problems and to have the potential to greatly increase the time and resources to complete a pathway or to 
result in the failure to complete a pathway. 
 
Estimation of TD uses expert judgment to identify the sources of intrinsic difficulty in completing a 
pathway segment, such as difficulty from criticality hazards, radiation, lack of design information, lack of 
access, or inability to fabricate or produce equipment or materials covered by export controls.  Estimation 
of TD for a complete pathway uses the combined sources of difficulty for all segments. 
 
The metric scale for the TD measure reflects the probability that a pathway will end in failure and thus 
depends on the resources and capabilities available to a proliferant State.  Thus, for example, the TD of an 
external segment to construct and operate a concealed centrifuge enrichment plant may become lower if a 
State has an operating commercial enrichment capability or can access expert guidance.  However, the 
TD for manufacturing specific components for centrifuges, such as frequency invertors, may remain high 
if a State does not have a domestic commercial capability to manufacture these components.  Most of the 
nuclear components that have high TD to manufacture are monitored by international export controls and 
by national intelligence services.  The evaluation of the DP measure may include the potential for export 
controls to detect the acquisition of such equipment.  
 
The use of probabilistic methods can facilitate aggregation of the TD measure associated with each 
segment in a pathway.  Examples based on Markov models are contained in Yue, Cheng, Papazoglou, 
Azarm, and Bari [4].  Table 2 summarizes key characteristics of the TD measure. 
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Table 1   Example Quantitative Metrics and Scales for PR Measures 
 
(qualitative PR ranking [Very Low Æ Very High],  
numerical range for bins, and median numerical values) 
 
Measures and Metrics Metric Scales  
Bins  (Median) 
Proliferation Resistance 
Proliferation Resistance Measures Determined by Intrinsic Features 
0-5%    (2%) Very Low 
5-25%    (10%) Low 
25-75%   (50%) Medium 
75-95%   (90%) High 
Proliferation Technical Difficulty (TD) 
Example metric:  Probability of pathway 
failure from inherent technical difficulty 
considering threat capabilities 
95-100%   (98%) Very High 
0-5%    (2%) Very Low 
5-25%    (10%) Low 
25-75%    (50%) Medium 
75-100%    (90%) High 
Proliferation Cost (PC)  
Example metric:  Fraction of national 
resources for military capabilities 
>100%    (>100%) Very High 
0-3 mon   (2 mon) Very Low 
3 mon-1 yr (8 mon) Low 
1-10 yr   (5 yr) Medium 
10 yr-30 yr   (20 yr) High 
Proliferation Time (PT) 
Example metric:  Total time to complete 
pathway 
>30 yr    (>30 yr) Very High 
HEU Very Low 
WG-Pu Low 
RG-Pu Medium 
DB-Pu High 
Fissile Material Type (MT)  
Example metric: Dimensionless ranked 
categories (HEU, WG-Pu, RG-Pu, DB-
Pu, LEU); interpolation based on material 
attributes 
LEU Very High 
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Table 1   Example Quantitative Metrics and Scales for PR Measures (continued) 
 
 
Measures and Metrics Metric Scales  
Bins  (Median) 
Proliferation Resistance 
Proliferation Resistance Measures Determined by Extrinsic Measures and Intrinsic Features 
a Very Low 
b Low 
c Medium 
d High 
Detection Probability (DP)   
Example metric: Cumulative detection 
probability  
e Very High 
<0.01 
(0.005 GWyr/PDI) 
Very Low 
0.01-0.04 
(0.02 GWyr/PDI) 
Low 
0.04-0.1 
(0.07 GWyr/PDI) 
Medium 
0.1-0.3 
(0.2 GWyr/PDI) 
High 
Detection Resource Efficiency (DE)   
Example metric:  GW(e) years of capacity 
supported (or other normalization 
variable) per Person Days of Inspection 
(PDI) (or inspection $) 
>0.3 
(1.0 GWyr/PDI) 
Very High 
 Very Low 
 Low 
 Medium 
 High 
Probability of Adversary Success 
(for PP) 
 Very High 
 Very Low 
 Low 
 Medium 
 High 
Consequences (for PP) 
 Very High 
 Very Low 
 Low 
 Medium 
 High 
Physical Protection Resources (for PP) 
 Very High 
NOTES:  HEU = high-enriched uranium, nominally 95% 235U; WG-Pu = weapons-grade plutonium, 
nominally 94% fissile Pu isotopes; RG-Pu = reactor-grade plutonium, nominally 70% fissile Pu isotopes; 
DB-Pu = deep burn plutonium, nominally 43% fissile Pu isotopes; LEU = low-enriched plutonium, 
nominally 5% 235U. 
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a Significantly lower cumulative detection probability than the IAEA detection probability and 
timeliness goal for depleted, natural, and LEU uranium.  
b 50% in 1 year (This equates to IAEA detection probability and timeliness goal for 1 significant 
quantity of depleted, natural, and LEU uranium). 
c 20% in 3 months, 50% in 1 year (This equates to IAEA detection probability and timeliness goal 
for 1 significant quantity of spent fuel/irradiated material). 
d 50% in 1 month, 90% in 1 year (This equates to IAEA detection probability and timeliness goal 
for 1 significant quantity HEU/separated Pu). 
e Significantly greater cumulative detection probability than the IAEA detection probability and 
timeliness goal for HEU/separated Pu. 
 
 
Table 2   Summary of Characteristics for the Proliferation Technical Difficulty (TD) Measure 
 
Characteristic Description 
Definition Inherent difficulty of the segment 
Typical attributes to be 
considered for estimation 
Criticality hazards 
Radioactivity levels 
Availability of open information 
Access to specialized export-controlled components or 
       materials 
Example metric Probability of pathway failure from inherent technical difficulty 
considering threat capabilities 
Segments-to-pathway 
aggregation method 
Calculate the probability of pathway failure on the basis of the segments 
involved. 
 
Proliferation Cost (PC) Measure 
 
The PC measure is estimated in dollars and can be scaled with the total resources available to a proliferant 
State for military expenditures, which may be on the order of $2 billion per year for a reactor state or $20 
billion per year for a fuel cycle state.  Table 3 provides an index for scaling the value of PC from low (< 
10%) to very high (> 100%). This measure expresses the economic and staffing investment required to 
overcome the multiple barriers that impede completion of the action associated with the segment.   
 
The PC measure is aggregated over a pathway by summing the value of the measure for each segment in 
the pathway.  In many cases, this measure will be dominated by one segment.  Note that this measure 
does not include the cost of the declared Generation IV NES but does include the cost of modifications 
made to that system to complete the segment.  These modifications may include process modifications as 
well as modifications intended to defeat safeguard verification activities. Table 3 summarizes key 
characteristics of the PC measure. 
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Table 3   Summary of Characteristics for the Proliferation Cost (PC) Measure 
 
Characteristic Description 
Definition Total cost of segment 
Typical attributes to be 
considered for estimation 
Minimum cost for setting up the minimum needed infrastructure to 
complete the segment 
Cost from misuse of civilian infrastructure/personnel 
Example metric Fraction of national resources for military capabilities 
Segments-to-pathway 
aggregation method 
Sum of segment estimates. Can be normalized to national resources for 
military capabilities. 
 
 
Proliferation Time (PT) Measure 
 
The PT measure is estimated in units of time, as shown in Table 4, and ranges from very low (< 3 
months) to very high (> 30 years).  The proliferation time is the minimum time required to overcome the 
multiple barriers that impede completion of the action associated with the acquisition and processing 
segments.  Typically, PT is measured from the time that the proliferant State initiates its first detectable 
activity (e.g., its first action to divert material or misuse a declared facility).  However, the analyst may 
select other initiation times, such as the time when the proliferant State’s planning starts if the analyst 
judges this to be important in affecting the State’s preferences between pathways.  The analyst should 
state explicitly, the basis used for selecting an initiation time and use it consistently.  Typically PT is 
estimated at the end of the processing segment and does not include the weapon fabrication time (which is 
subsumed in the MT measure).  In practice, though, weapon fabrication time can be expected to be short 
(a few weeks) compared to the PT, so this distinction is not important. 
 
For example, abrupt diversion of spent fuel from a storage facility might require less than 1 month.  
Extraction of plutonium from irradiated targets might require 3 to 12 months, assuming that the extraction 
facility (whether clandestine or obtained through misuse of a declared facility) is already available. In 
making these estimates, the analyst must clearly state assumptions. These assumptions include what 
preparations the proliferant State has completed before initiating the action associated with the segment 
(e.g., an assumption that the proliferant State constructed and commissioned a clandestine plutonium 
extraction facility before initiating this segment and assumed throughput).   
 
For a pathway, the PT measure is aggregated by summing serial activities and taking into account parallel 
activities.  Parallel and serial activities depend on the details of each pathway. Table 4 summarizes key 
characteristics of the PT measure. 
 
Table 4   Summary of Characteristics for the Proliferation Time (PT) Measure 
 
Characteristic Description 
Definition Total time required to complete segment 
Typical attributes to be 
considered for estimation 
Maximum diversion or production rate 
Storage duration 
Extent of required equipment modifications 
Example metric Total time to complete pathway (e.g., months, years) 
Segments-to-pathway 
aggregation method 
Appropriate aggregation of parallel and serial activities 
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Fissile Material Type (MT) Measure 
 
The MT measure ranks types of fissile material produced by the processing segment—typically metal—
based on their utility for use in fabrication of a nuclear explosive and the relative preference of a 
proliferant State.  As such, the MT measure is only estimated for pathways; it is not estimated for 
segments. It is, however, of interest to report MT at the end of major stages. For, example, as an 
intermediate result, a designer may want to know the various possible MTs emerging from the acquisition 
stage.  
 
The specific design tradeoffs that arise from fissile material properties will affect several areas that would 
be important to the objectives of a proliferant State:  technical performance (e.g., reliability of yield, both 
in achieving a successful first test and in achieving reliable performance after a sequence of tests), the 
ability to stockpile the material, and deliverability.   
 
Because detailed information on the relationship between MT and weapons design is sensitive, the PR 
methodology applies an approximate ranking (Table 5) of nuclear material types.  This ranking reflects 
relative PR based on the preferences of a proliferant State in attempting to acquire its first few weapons. 
The ranking ranges from material like high-enriched uranium (HEU), for which design and fabrication of 
nuclear explosives has very low difficulty (very low PR ranking), to low-enriched uranium (LEU), for 
which fabrication of a workable nuclear explosive is essentially impossible (very high PR ranking).  The 
basic range is as follows:   
 
• very low PR – HEU  
• low PR – weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu)  
• medium PR – reactor-grade plutonium (RG-Pu)  
• high PR – “deep-burn” plutonium (DB-Pu)  
• very high PR – LEU.     
 
The very low PR ranking for HEU results primarily from the extremely low spontaneous neutron 
emission rate compared to all plutonium compositions.  This difference substantially simplifies weapons 
design and gives a proliferant State high confidence in obtaining reliable performance on the first test or 
use of nuclear weapons. 
 
For plutonium, a very wide range of isotopic compositions can be generated depending on the conditions 
of reactor operation and recycle of spent fuel. The basis for categorizing the attractiveness of different 
plutonium compositions is complex and, when presented in detail, is sensitive and classified.  Here the 
MT PR ranking for plutonium compositions is based on the study of the U.S. National Research Council 
on the spent-fuel standard [5]: 
 
“If it is assumed that proliferators in all categories will ultimately be capable of obtaining 
reasonably pure plutonium metal…then the main intrinsic barriers in this category are those 
associated with deviation of the plutonium's isotopic composition from 'weapons grade.' …” 
 
“In the case of…a proliferant State we rate the barrier [from reactor-grade plutonium] as 
'moderate' in importance:  such a state would probably prefer to avoid if possible the burdens 
posed by isotopic deviations for design, fabrication, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, but it 
would also probably have the capabilities to cope with the burdens in ways that achieved a level 
of weapon performance adequate for the proliferant State's initial purposes.” 
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When plutonium is recycled, it is possible to further degrade the isotopic composition.  For the MT 
measure, such degraded plutonium is listed as DB-Pu, which would have high concentrations of Pu-238 
and thus high heat generation rates.  A proliferant State would be expected to expend great effort to 
identify proliferation pathways that would result in acquiring material with a lower MT PR ranking, and 
thus the MT PR ranking of DB-Pu is listed as high. A more detailed discussion regarding the level of 
preference that a proliferant State would display between materials of higher and lower MT ranking is 
contained in Appendix D of the PR&PP methodology report [1].  
 
In many cases, the simple MT ranking, along with the qualitative discussion of MT provided above and in 
Appendix D.4 of the PR&PP methodology report [1], will be sufficient to allow pathways to be compared 
and ranked.  Table 5 summarizes key characteristics of the MT measure. 
 
Table 5   Summary of Characteristics for the Fissile Material Type (MT) Measure 
 
Characteristic Description 
Definition Characteristics of metal for weapons fabrication 
Typical attributes to be 
considered for estimation 
Spontaneous neutron emission rate 
Heat generation rate 
Gamma radiation activity 
Bare-sphere critical mass 
Example metric Dimensionless ranked categories (HEU, WG-Pu, RG-Pu, DB-Pu, LEU); 
interpolation based on material attributes 
Segments-to-pathway 
aggregation method 
Not applicable 
 
Detection Probability (DP) Measure 
 
The DP measure expresses the probability that action described by a pathway segment is detected.  DP 
results from measurements that (1) detect anomalies generated during the execution of pathway segments 
and (2) are performed to assess that anomalies originate from actions in actual pathway segments rather 
than legitimate, inadvertent sources.  DP is generally expressed as a cumulative probability function. If a 
defined safeguards approach is not available, however, DP can only be expressed by a very wide 
uncertainty band. 
 
In addition, a variety of concealment strategies may affect DP.  The effects of a concealment strategy are 
determined by analyzing pathways that include the strategy, not by assigning an arbitrary DP uncertainty 
for assumed effects of concealment methods.   
 
Safeguards involve continuously evolving technology.  A number of system attributes can affect both the 
optimal approach for the application of safeguards and the effectiveness of that approach in providing 
high DP.  The following assumes a robust IAEA safeguards regime with the attendant technologies that 
would promote safeguardability of facilities and operations. 
 
To detect internal material diversion segments, measurements may be combined to detect the material 
transfer and the resulting change in material inventory uncertainty in detection arises from three sources:  
(1) instrument measurement uncertainty; (2) the possibility that a measured anomaly has a legitimate 
origin, such as inadvertent hold up of material, inadvertent operator destruction of a seal, or inadvertent 
delay of an inspection due to legitimate safety or access restrictions; and (3) uncertainty that the actual 
facility configuration is the same as that assumed in the design of the safeguards system, where, for 
example, an undeclared penetration may exist in or be added to a facility. 
13 
 
To detect internal facility misuse segments, measurements to detect misuse must be tailored to detect 
anomalies that the action of a segment would generate.  Uncertainties in detection of misuse have similar 
origins to those listed above for internal material diversion segments. 
 
To detect external segments, methods include the use of tools such as commercial satellite photography 
and environmental sampling, as well as the use of various types of information that may be supplied by 
third party sources, such as information from national export control programs, which monitor and detect 
purchases or transfers of sensitive or dual purpose equipment and technologies, and information gathered 
by national technical means.  External segments that use equipment diverted from declared facilities, such 
as frequency invertors in enrichment plants, could also be detected by monitoring the inventory of this 
equipment in declared facilities. Although the IAEA does not currently have goals for detection of 
clandestine activities and facilities, the IAEA utilizes information obtained from a variety of sources, 
including non-safeguards databases, open sources and third parties. 
 
A potentially significant tool for enhancing the detection of external segments is the Additional Protocol 
(AP).  This tool would make programs to develop nuclear capabilities, including enrichment and 
reprocessing, in NPT countries, more transparent (and also subject to verification).  It would create a 
broader IAEA toolkit, including location-specific environmental sampling, to verify the declarations.  AP, 
for example, would be a principal means of verifying that a user state that had agreed to forego 
development of ENR in exchange for fuel assurances was in fact in compliance with such an 
understaking, and that there was no evidence of activities that might be inconsistent with this.  AP is thus 
relevant to both internal segments—misuse of a declared facility—and external segments (e.g., a declared 
10-year national fuel cycle plan that provides a baseline against which to evaluate such things as 
procurements that are inconsistent with that plan.  
 
Under modern integrated safeguards, safeguards detection resources such as the frequency of inspections 
are increased progressively as anomalies are detected. This provides a higher cumulative confidence of 
detection with lower detection resources.  Likewise, safeguards approaches that provide multiple and 
diverse measurements capable of detecting the actions described by a pathway segment increase the DP. 
 
For internal pathway segments, the reference metric scale for the DP measure, shown in Table 6, is based 
on a comparison with the applicable IAEA safeguards detection goals contained in the IAEA safeguards 
criteria.  A “medium” DP meets the IAEA safeguards detection goals for spent fuel and irradiated 
materials.  A “high” DP meets IAEA goals for HEU and separated plutonium, and a “low” DP meets 
IAEA goals for depleted uranium, natural uranium, and LEU. 
 
For external pathway segments, DP may have large uncertainty unless the segment generates obvious 
visual, thermal, or other signatures.  If detection uncertainty is large, it may be useful to provide decision 
makers with a qualitative, general description of the methods available to detect the external segment, 
particularly if the actual DP cannot be readily evaluated and presented on a metric scale like that of 
Table 6. Table 6 summarizes key characteristics of the DP measure. 
 
Detection Resource Efficiency (DE) Measure 
 
The DE measure is estimated for each pathway segment by summing estimates of the manpower (e.g., 
Person Days of Inspection, PDI) or the cost (in $) required to implement the detection methods for the 
segment.  Safeguards resources are then aggregated for all segments of a pathway, using logical 
assumptions (e.g., a single instrument may provide detection capabilities for multiple segments).  
Estimates of time or cost will necessarily be based on currently accepted safeguards approaches but 
anticipated changes to safeguards approaches and safeguards technology (e.g., increased use of remote 
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monitoring) should be considered that could occur over the multi-decade life cycle for most nuclear 
facilities  The DE measure is normalized by a variable such as the energy production supported by the 
system element, and is presented as the ratio of that normalization variable divided by the inspection time 
or cost (for example, in units of gigawatt years per PDI). Table 7 summarizes key characteristics of the 
DE measure. 
 
Table 6   Summary of Characteristics for the Detection Probability (DP) Measure 
 
Characteristic Description 
Definition Cumulative probability and confidence level for detection of a pathway 
segment 
Typical attributes to be 
considered for estimation 
Attributes important to design information verification 
Transparency of layout 
Possibility to use 3-d scenario reconstruction models 
Possibility to have visual access to equipment while operational 
Comprehensiveness of facility documentation and data 
Attributes important to nuclear material accounting 
Uniqueness of material signature 
Hardness of radiation signature 
Possibility of applying passive measurement methods 
Item/bulk 
Throughput rate 
Batch/continuous process 
Nuclear material heat generation rate 
Attributes important to containment and surveillance 
Operational practice 
Extent of automation 
Standardization of items in transfer 
Possibility to apply visual monitoring 
Number of possible transfer routes for items in transit 
Example metric Cumulative detection probability.  
Segments-to-pathway 
aggregation method 
Calculate the probability of pathway detection on the basis of the segments 
involved. 
(e.g. the probability of pathway detection will be P(d) = 1 – P(nd), where 
the probability of pathway non-detection, P(nd) = Π(1-Pi(d)), with Pi(d) 
being the probability of detection of the ith segment, under the hypothesis 
of the independence of detection events). 
 
 
Table 7  Summary of Characteristics for the Detection Resource Efficiency (DE) Measure 
 
Characteristic Description 
Definition Total inspector time or cost of safeguarding the segment 
Typical attributes to be 
considered for estimation 
See Table 2.10 of Reference [1] 
Example metric GW(e) years of capacity supported (or other normalization variable) per 
Person Days of Inspection (PDI) (or inspection $) 
Segments-to-pathway 
aggregation method 
Aggregation to total inspection time or safeguards cost, normalized to an 
appropriate scale, such as nuclear energy production supported [GW(e) 
year] 
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Physical Protection Measures 
 
The three PP factors are considered differently. 
 
• Probability of Adversary Success (PAS) - The probability that an adversary will successfully 
complete the actions described by a pathway and generates a consequence. This measure assesses 
the probability that an adversary will successfully complete the actions described by a pathway 
and generate a consequence. If the actions required to complete the pathway are within the 
resources and capability of the adversary, then the probability of adversary success depends on the 
capability of the PPS to detect the actions, delay the adversary, and neutralize the adversary before 
the actions can be completed. The PAS measure is commonly used in the design and analysis of 
PPSs, and various tools are available to quantitatively evaluate the measure. For some pathways, 
the PAS may be controlled by a small number of segments, such as the physical difficulty in 
obtaining access to safety equipment in attempting to sabotage passively safe nuclear reactors and 
the difficulty of removing and processing spent-fuel assemblies in attempting to steal plutonium. 
 
• Consequences (C) - The effects resulting from the successful completion of the adversary's action 
described by a pathway. Consequences are defined as the effects resulting from the successful 
completion of the adversary's intended action described by a pathway. This measure reflects both 
the attractiveness to the adversary and the relative importance of a pathway in generating adverse 
effects. Theft consequences can be expressed in terms of the quantity and quality of the material 
removed. Appendix D.4 discusses fissile material quality of materials for nuclear explosives, in 
relationship to sub-national threats. Sabotage consequences can be measured by the number of 
physical quantities, acute fatalities, latent fatalities, quantities of material per unit area, etc. 
Perhaps the most meaningful measurement of sabotage consequences at the coarse pathway level 
is whether a release is contained, kept to the plant site, or released offsite. 
 
• Physical Protection Resources (PPR) - the staffing, capabilities, and costs required to provide PP, 
such as background screening, detection, interruption, and neutralization, and the sensitivity of 
these resources to changes in the threat sophistication and capability. This measure reflects the 
resources devoted to provide extrinsic features-a PPS-to detect, delay, and neutralize an adversary. 
At the lowest end, in system elements that provide very long intrinsic delay times, this measure 
may involve the cost of alarm systems and offsite police response. At the high end, this measure 
may involve extensive investments in maintaining large, armed security forces and in detection, 
delay, and response systems. The PPR measure quantifies the staff, capabilities, and costs (both 
infrastructure and operation) required to provide a level of PP for a given NES. As with the DE 
measure for PR, the PPR measure for a given pathway is evaluated for each pathway segment and 
then aggregated appropriately, noting that some PPS elements can provide responses to multiple 
segments. PPR for targets can be evaluated by aggregating resources for all pathways associated 
with the target. Likewise PPR for a system element can be evaluated by aggregating the resources 
required for all targets in the system element. The PPR measure can also be expressed as a cost 
per unit of energy (TWh) produced. 
 
The three measures for PP are consistent with those commonly used by national programs to make 
efficient investments to protect critical infrastructure and key assets. PP is a national responsibility and 
thus involves national policies. The goal is to optimally allocate resources to limit risk to a uniform level 
across both nuclear and non-nuclear critical infrastructure and key assets. Quantitative analysis for PAS, 
C, and PPR will also be required to support licensing and deployment decisions for new nuclear 
infrastructure. 
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5.  POLICY FACTORS AND GRADING 
 
In addition to “Technical Factors” that are supported by the PR&PP metrics and measures, the final 
GNEP NPIA should evaluate alternative actions against notable nonproliferation “Policy Factors.” The 
purpose of this additional aspect of the approach is to capture any high level U.S. nonproliferation policy 
value. It is difficult to fully evaluate the nonproliferation merit of the GNEP “architecture” as a 
technology transfer restraining mechanism when measuring purely against technical factors which do not 
consider the broader suite of policy, legal, and institutional approaches used to secure nonproliferation 
objectives.  
 
The following draft Policy Factors are proposed for use in the NPIA analysis.  
 
1. Restrains the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology 
 
This factor would allow policy effect analysis of whether GNEP approaches, products, and facilities 
contribute to restraint in the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technology beyond existing technology holding 
states (10 enrichers, 6 reprocessors). This is a presidential (POTUS) level policy factor put forward in the 
National Defense Univeristy speech by President George Bush in February 2004. 
 
2. Minimizes and avoids accumulation of stocks of separated weapons useable material 
 
This factor would allow policy effect analysis of whether GNEP approaches, products, and facilities 
contribute to minimization and avoidance of accumulation of separated stocks. This is a POTUS level 
policy factor put forward in National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17) (President George 
Bush, December 2002) and other documents. 
 
3.  Enhances U.S. tangible nonproliferation policy and legal influence on the structure of the 
international fuel cycle 
 
This factor would allow policy effect analysis on whether GNEP approaches, products, and facilities 
contribute to tangible enhancement of U.S. influence, for example, through the system of legal obligations 
set forth in bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. The word “tangible” is used to indicate that 
the effect should be as direct as practicable through policy, regulatory, or legal mechanisms. Indirect 
effects are also meaningful (setting an “example”), but of much lesser value generally. For example, the 
“no domestic reprocessing policy” of the U.S. was an indirect policy approach. Some argue that this 
formed the basis for a policy of global restraint that largely retarded development of reprocessing 
technology worldwide while others argue that fuel cycle economics have been largely responsible for the 
current situation rather than the policy. By way of comparison, the general decline of U.S. nuclear 
manufacturing capability is having a direct and long-term impact on the U.S. ability to influence the 
future international fuel cycle through an accelerating loss of nuclear trade obligations on technology and 
material – a direct effect. 
 
4. Strengthens nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security by encouraging the adoption and 
implementation of sound nonproliferation infrastructures. 
 
This factor would allow policy effect analysis on whether GNEP approaches lead to the adoption by 
others, for example, of Additional Protocols; the IAEA Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials (CPPNM) and its amendment; export controls, and implementation of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR/1540).  It could look at capacity building efforts to help 
others put in place the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks and develop and deploy the human 
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resources needed.  This factor speaks both to the issue of reducing the risk of terrorism world-wide as 
well as promoting nonproliferation norms.    
 
Proposed Grading Structure 
 
The policy analysis should cast logical arguments as to how GNEP approaches, products, and facilities 
participate and enable U.S. nonproliferation policy objectives. The analysis should be as brief, 
straightforward, and understandable as possible to educated lay-persons. Suggest the following set of 
“Grades” to be applied to the above Policy Factors: 
 
Meets U.S. nonproliferation policy objectives 
 
This grade is given if the vast majority of reasoned argument supports the conclusion. The main points for 
should be laid out in a bulletized list. 
 
May create U.S. nonproliferation policy uncertainty 
 
This grade is given if significant reasoned arguments can be made for and against. The main points for 
and against should be laid out in bulletized pro and con lists. 
 
Raises U.S. nonproliferation policy concerns 
 
This grade is given if the vast majority of reasoned argument supports the conclusion. The main points 
against should be laid out in a bulletized list. 
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